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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, water from Lake Okeechobee has flowed slowly over
central and southern Florida creating a large wetland.1 In 1850,
Congress transferred more than twenty million acres of this wetland2 to
Florida for the express purpose of constructing “levees and drains to
reclaim the swamp and overflowed lands therein . . . .”3 After several
failed attempts at reclamation, Florida, with the help of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, altered the natural flow of ground and surface water
in the area, transforming some of the wetland into fertile farmland.4 The
reclamation project, officially known as the Central and South Florida
Project for Flood Control and Other Purposes (C&SF Project),5 involved
four principal water control technologies: (1) levees; (2) water storage

1. “Before drainage and canalization, water moved through the Everglades as a
slow but pervasive surface flow from Lake Okeechobee through a mosaic of sawgrass
marshes, wet sloughs, and forested islands along a topographic gradient of about 1 m per
56 km.” Daniel L. Childers et al., Decadal Change in Vegetation and Soil Phosphorus
Pattern Across the Everglades Landscape, 32 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 344, 346 (2003).
2. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, The Destructive Role of Land Use
Planning, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 95, 129 (2000). Approximately 1.5 million acres of the
20 million acres transferred has been converted into the Everglades National Park.
Everglade National Park, Park Establishment, http://www.nps.gov/ever/eco/nordeen.htm
(last visited Nov 8, 2005).
3. 43 U.S.C. § 982 (2000). In full, the statute reads:
To enable the several States (but not including the States of Kansas, Nebraska,
and Nevada) to construct the necessary levees and drains, to reclaim the
swamp and overflowed lands therein—the whole of the swamp and overflowed
lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation, and remaining unsold on or after the
28th day of September, A.D. 1850, are granted and belong to the several States
respectively, in which said lands are situated: Provided, however, That said
grant of swamp and overflowed lands, as to the States of California,
Minnesota, and Oregon, is subject to the limitations, restrictions and conditions
hereinafter named and specified in this chapter, as applicable to said three lastnamed States respectively.
Id.
4. Everglade Plan, Development of Central & South Florida (C&SF) Project,
http://www.evergladesplan.org/about/restudy_csf_devel.cfm (last visited Nov. 08, 2005).
In 2002, Florida ranked ninth in the value of farm products and second in production of
fresh vegetables with sales of $6.85 billion and $1.6 billion, respectively. Florida
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Overview of Florida Agriculture,
http://www.florida-agriculture.com/agfacts.htm (last visited Jan 30, 2005).
5. The C&SF Project is a multipurpose project that was first authorized by the
Flood Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 858, 62 Stat. 1171, 1175 (1948).
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areas; (3) canals; and (4) pump stations.6 The combined effect of these
technologies was to stop the natural westward flow of the water and to
artificially redirect the flow eastward, separating habitable regions from
the surrounding wetland.7 Today, these regions are home to more than
136,000 people and contain both urban and agricultural developments.8
In 2003, the C&SF Project was the subject of a Supreme Court case
that could dramatically limit the reach of the Clean Water Act (CWA).9
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, the Court heard arguments regarding whether a water transfer
occurring within the C&SF Project could be regulated by the CWA’s
primary pollution control program, the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES).10 The Court held that water transfers
may be so regulated if they occur between two “meaningfully distinct”
water bodies.11 In a somewhat surprising development, the government,
in its amicus brief, advocated a radically new interpretation of the CWA,
which would remove all water transfer activities from the reach of the
The government’s interpretation is
NPDES permit program.12
commonly known as the “unitary waters” approach because, under this
6. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 100
(2004). The C&SF Project works as follows: (1) canals collect ground water and
rainwater from an area that includes urban, agricultural, and residential developments;
(2) the pump stations transfer water from the canals to water storage areas; (3) the levees
prevent the water from returning from water storage areas back to the urbanized areas.
Id.
7. EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 60 (Steven M. Davis &
John C. Ogden eds., 1994).
8. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100.
9. Id. at 98-112.
10. Id. at 104. See discussion infra Section III for more information on the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System.
11. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 112. The Court held that “a point source need not be
the original source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollutant to ‘navigable
waters,’ which are, in turn, defined as ‘the waters of the United States.’” Id. at 105.
However, the Court went on to state that “it is possible that the District Court will
conclude that [they] are not meaningfully distinct water bodies. If it does so, then the
[transfer] will not need a NPDES permit.” Id. at 112.
12. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 19, S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22137034.
“[T]he waters of the United States” should be viewed as a whole for purposes
of NPDES permitting requirements. Once a pollutant is present in one part of
“the waters of the United States,” its simple conveyance to a different part is
not a “discharge of a pollutant” within the meaning of the Act.
Id.
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approach, all waters of the United States are viewed as a singular water
body.13
This Comment will, first, determine whether the government’s unitary
waters approach is a viable interpretation of the CWA. Second, it will
explore what characteristics should be considered to determine whether
two water bodies are “meaningfully distinct.” Finally, this Comment
will explore the possible consequences of applying the NPDES program
to water transfers between two water bodies.
In order to clarify this Comment, this section will summarize the
important aspects of the Miccosukee case. Section II will briefly introduce
the CWA. Section III will introduce the NPDES permitting program and
will discuss the requirements of the NPDES program and how
Miccosukee could alter those requirements. Section IV will discuss the
government’s unitary waters approach and consists of three parts: (1) an
introduction to the government’s approach; (2) an analysis of the
arguments in favor of the unitary waters approach; and (3) a discussion
of whether other parts of the CWA are in conflict with the government’s
interpretation. Section V will discuss the characteristics that should be
used to determine whether two water bodies are “meaningfully distinct.”
Finally, section VI will explore the potential consequences of applying
the NPDES program to water transfer activities.
A. Summary of Miccosukee
The Miccosukee Indian Tribe (Tribe) brought suit against the South
Florida Water Management District (Water District) for the environmental
harm caused by the C&SF Project.14 At the time of the case, the Water
District was in charge of the C&SF Project.15 The litigation arose after
the Tribe discovered that run-off from the surrounding developments
had been channeled into the South New River Canal (Canal) and
pumped into the Wetland Conservation Area Number Three (Wetland).16
This was all done pursuant to the C&SF Project.17 The run-off that
13. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-06; see also Kristin Carden, Case Comment,
South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 28 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 549, 554 (“[T]he Court discussed the ‘unitary waters’ argument advanced
primarily by the federal government.”).
14. Brief for the Respondent Friends of the Everglades at 1-2, S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
22733911. The CS&F project channels agriculture run-off and pumps it back into the
Everglades. Id. at 5. This run-off causes the growth of foreign vegetation, including cattails.
Id. at 6. Once these cattails take over, oxygen levels are no longer sufficient to support
the native aquatic plant life or animals. Id.
15. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 100-01.
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flowed into the Canal had higher phosphorus levels than those naturally
found in the Wetland.18 As a consequence, once pumped into the
Wetland, the phosphorus-enriched water caused the growth of foreign
vegetation, which began to threaten the existence of the naturally
occurring flora.19
However, despite its negative environmental effects, the transfer of
water could not be stopped without flooding a populous area and
displacing thousands of residents.20 The Canal serves as a collection area
for two main water sources. First, it collects excess run-off from the
surrounding agricultural and urban developments.21 Secondly, it collects
water that naturally seeps into it from the Wetland. 22 Due to the porous
nature of the surrounding soil, and the natural westward drainage flow,
water is shared between the Wetland and the Canal.23
The Tribe alleged that the Water District violated the CWA by
pumping the phosphorus-enriched water into the Wetland without
obtaining an NPDES permit.24 An NPDES permit authorizes the dumping
of polluted substances into waters of the United States.25 Generally, five
elements must be present in order to trigger the need for an NPDES
permit: “(1) a pollutant must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters
(4) from (5) a point source.”26 Both parties agreed that the pump station
that transfers water from the Canal to the Wetland is a point source, that
the Wetland and the Canal are navigable waters, and that the water
pumped into the Wetland contains pollutants.27 Therefore, the primary
dispute centered on whether the pumping of water between the Canal
and the Wetland constituted an addition of pollutants to navigable

18. Brief for Respondent Friends of the Everglades, supra note 14, at 6.
19. Id.
20. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 100-01.
21. Id. at 100.
22. Id. at 110.
23. Id. “Because Everglades soil is extremely porous, water flows easily between
ground and surface waters, so much so that ‘[g]round and surface waters are essentially
the same thing.’” Id.
24. See Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida at 12-14, S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22766719.
25. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (referring to
when NPDES permits are required for dams).
26. Id. at 165.
27. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364,
1367 (11th Cir. 2002).

1263

BLANK.DOC

12/22/2005 11:18 AM

waters.28 If so, then an NPDES permit would be required to exchange
water from the Canal to the Wetland.29
The Water District and the government, which became involved in the
case because of the potential impact on the NPDES permitting
program,30 contended that the pumping of water from the Canal to the
Wetland did not fall under the NPDES program.31 The Water District
argued that since water naturally seeps between the Wetland and the
Canal, they share a hydrological connection and as such, are part of a
single water body.32 In addition, the government argued that all waters
of the United States should be viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES
permitting.33 Carried to its logical conclusion, such an assertion means
that all waters within the United States are collectively one giant body of
water and any conveyance within this singular body of water could
never constitute an addition of pollutants.34 Therefore, according to the
government’s argument, an NPDES permit would only be required when
pollutants are first introduced into the waters of the United States.35
Understood this way, the pumping of water from the Canal to the
Wetland is merely a conveyance within the national water body and does
not constitute an addition of pollutants as defined by the CWA.36
In response, the Tribe advocated that the Canal and the Wetland are
two distinct water bodies because they do not share similar biological or
ecosystem characteristics.37 In support of its argument, the Tribe
pointed to the fact that the Wetland is home to unique vegetation and
wildlife, while the Canal is not.38 In addition, the Tribe noted that the
28. Id.
29. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 102-03
(2004).
30. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12
at 1-2.
31. Id. at 14; Brief for Petitioner at 20-24, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137015.
32. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31 at 46-49.
33. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 105-06.
34. Id. at 106. “Because the Act requires NPDES permits only when there is an
addition of a pollutant ‘to navigable waters,’ the Government’s approach would lead to
the conclusion that such permits are not required when water from one navigable water
body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable water body.” Id.
35. For example, a company dumping pollution from their factory into a river
would still require a NPDES permit. However, if that pollution is later discharged into
an adjacent lake via a pump station, then a NPDES permit is not required for that
transfer.
36. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109.
37. Id. at 110; see also Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida, supra note 24, at 6-7.
38. “‘The Everglades is an extensive and unique wetlands system consisting of
millions of acres of shallow sawgrass marshes, wet prairies, aquatic sloughs, and tree
islands.’ The area provides a home for unique wildlife such as wading birds, and
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Wetland and the Canal have drastically different water qualities and
therefore should be considered two distinct water bodies.39
The federal district court granted the Tribe’s motion for summary
judgment and issued an order requiring the Water District to obtain an
NPDES permit for the pumping of water between the Canal and the
Wetland.40 In addition, it enjoined the Water District from operating the
pump station until an NPDES permit was obtained.41 The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling but vacated the injunction due
to the practical necessity of the pumping and the danger suspension
would present to thousands of residents.42
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.43 There was great
interest in this case as shown by the twenty-three separate amicus briefs
filed with the Court by a broad range of interested parties.44 To some,
threatened and endangered species such as wood storks, snail kites, bald eagles, Florida
panthers and American crocodiles.” Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
of Florida, supra note 24, at 6.
39. Id. at 7, 31 n.14.
40. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 99; Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., Nos. 98-6056-CIV, 98-6057-CIV, 1999 WL 33494862, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 30, 1999).
41. Id. at *6.
42. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364,
1369-71 (11th Cir. 2002). The appellate court held that “an addition from a point source
occurs if a point source is the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants into navigable
waters.” Id. at 1368. The court went on to state that the Canal was the cause-in-fact of
the addition of pollutants to the Wetland. Id. at 1369. However, the court did not affirm
the injunction because “severe flooding” would occur to a residential area. Id. at 1371.
43. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe Of Indians, 539 U.S. 957
(2003).
44. The thirteen amicus briefs filed in support of the Water District consisted of
the following: Brief for Amici Curiae Florida Fruit and Vegetable Ass’n et al. in Support
of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118364; Brief of Idaho Governor Dirk Kempthorne as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118368; Brief Amicus Curiae
of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of the Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22118373;
Brief of Amicus Curiae the City of Weston, Florida, in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22137027; Brief for the Lake Worth Drainage District and the Florida Ass’n of
Special Districts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner South Florida Water
Management District, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541
U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137027; Brief Amici Curiae of the National
Water Resources Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137029;
Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, S.
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this case appeared to be about a simple issue of statutory interpretation.45
For others, this case was an opportunity to clarify the reach of the
NPDES program.46
After reviewing the record and hearing oral arguments, the Supreme
Court decided to remand the case back to the district court because there
was not enough information to determine whether the Canal and the

Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02626), 2003 WL 22137030; Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New
Mexico in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137032; Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12; Brief of Amicus Curiae National
Ass’n of Home Builders in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22196454;
Brief for the Utility Water Act Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22196594; Brief of Amici Curiae the City of New York et al. in Support of
Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004)
(No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22220093; Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects
Coalition et al. in Support of Petitioner, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22137031. The remaining ten
amicus briefs filed in support of the Miccosukee Tribe consisted of the following: Brief
of Amici Curiae National Wildlife Federation et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22766717; Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95
(2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22766718; Amicus Curiae Brief of Tongue &
Yellowstone River Irrigation District et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
22793536; Brief of Amici Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Environmental Protection in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22793537;
Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Wildlife Federation et al. in Support of Respondents, S.
Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22793538; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. of
the United States Environmental Protection Agency in Support of Respondents, S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626),
2003 WL 22793539; Brief of Amici Curiae of the Coalition of Greater Minnesota Cities
and the City of Saint Cloud, Minnesota in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
22811822; Brief Amici Curiae of the National Tribal Environmental Council and the
National Congress of American Indians in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL
23189937; Amicus Brief of the Association of State Wetland Managers and the Tropical
Audubon Society in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733912; Brief of Amici
Curiae Trout Unlimited Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.
v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (No. 02-626), 2003 WL 22733910.
45. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra
note 24, at 12-19.
46. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
supra note 12, at 15.
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Wetland were two “meaningfully distinct” water bodies.47 However, the
Court gave no guidance on how to define “meaningfully distinct.”48
Additionally, the Court declined to resolve whether the federal
government’s “unitary waters” approach was a valid interpretation of the
CWA because neither the government nor the Water District raised the
issue before the Court of Appeals in its brief requesting certiorari.49
Nevertheless, the Court did invite the parties to take up the issue on
remand.50
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
commonly known as the Clean Water Act, marked a dramatic change to
the overall strategy of federal water pollution legislation.51 Prior to
1972, the main goal of federal water pollution laws was to assist the
states in achieving their own water quality standards.52 In contrast,
under the CWA, the federal government set a national standard of water
quality that replaced all existing state standards.53 Incorporated into the
national standard was the goal “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”54 In order to
accomplish this goal, section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the
“discharge of any pollutant by any person” into navigable waters.55 This
47. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112
(2004).
48. Id. at 111-12.
49. Id. at 109.
50. Id.
51. William L Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States—State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215 (2003).
The Clean Water Act of 1972 was revolutionary in many ways. It made the
federal government the dominant authority in an area where the states had long
held sway. It instituted a new system of technology-based effluent limitations
that would demand the same basic level of treatment for a particular industry,
regardless of whether it was located in Georgia or New York, Louisiana or
Wisconsin. No longer could an industry so effectively block state pollution
control efforts by threatening to relocate to a more lenient jurisdiction. And no
longer could discharge limitations be based solely upon the assimilative capacity
of the receiving waterway and its ability to meet a designated use—which might
well be only industrial or agricultural usage.
Id. at 286.
52. Id. at 292.
53. Id. at 286.
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
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represented a change to the basic approach of setting water quality
standards. Before the passing of the CWA, water quality standards were
set by determining how much pollution one water body could digest
without exceeding the ambient water quality standard.56 In contrast,
under the CWA, the national standard is exclusively concerned with
eliminating all discharges of pollutants into U.S. waters.57
However, an exception to this zero pollution approach is contained in
section 402 of the CWA, otherwise known as the NPDES permit
program.58 Under the NPDES permit program, “the Administrator may,
after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants,”59 upon condition that the
discharger meets all applicable effluent standards under the law.60 The
NPDES permit thus serves as a temporary patch until it is
technologically and economically feasible for the polluter to reduce its
discharge to zero.61
56. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7-8 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.N. 3668,
3678.
This section establishes a policy that the discharge of pollutants should be
eliminated by 1985, that the natural chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters be restored, and that an interim goal of a water quality
allowing fish propagation and suitable for swimming should be reached by
1981. The States are declared to have the primary responsibility and right to
implement such a goal. The policy declaration of the Federal Water Pollution
Act has been revised substantially in order to represent the departure in Federal
water pollution control policy from a water quality standards control
mechanism to a discharge control mechanism.
Id. Ambient water quality standards are defined as “provisions of State or Federal law
which consist of a designated use or uses for the waters of the United States and water
quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses.” 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i) (2003).
57. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7-8 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.A.N. 3668,
3678; see ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
386-89 (6th ed. 2003).
58. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000); see also 33 U.S.C § 1311(a)
(2000).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
Except as provided in sections 1328 and 1344 of this title, the Administrator
may, after opportunity for public hearing issue a permit for the discharge of
any pollutant, or combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 1311(a) of
this title, upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) all applicable
requirements under sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318, and 1343 of this
title, or (B) prior to the taking of necessary implementing actions relating to all
such requirements, such conditions as the Administrator determines are
necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
60. Id.; see also Karen M. McGaffey, Water Pollution Control Under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, in THE CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK 18 (Mark A.
Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“The CWA requires all dischargers to comply with effluent
limitations based on available pollution control technology. These ‘technology-based
limits’ are established after consideration of technological feasibility and cost.”).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (2000). This section states that the Administrator
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III. THE NPDES PERMIT PROGRAM
A. Background
The origin of the NPDES permit program can be traced back to
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899
(Refuse Act).62 This act gave authority to the Secretary of the Army,
upon the advice of the Chief Engineer, to permit the deposit of any
materials when “anchorage and navigation will not be injured thereby.”63
The primary purpose of the Refuse Act was to prevent foreign objects
from obstructing America’s waterways and, therefore, permits were only
required for “industrial discharges of ‘refuse’ into navigable waters.”64
In 1972, the CWA transferred the Secretary of the Army’s authority to
issue permits to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).65 In addition, Congress expanded the scope of the permit to
include the “discharge of any pollutant”66 in order for it to serve as the

must require the elimination of all discharges if the “elimination is technologically and
economically achievable for a category or class of point sources.” Id.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1342(a)(4), (2000).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000).
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers
and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind in any
place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of
any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such
navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or
otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed.
Id.
64. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2),(4) (2000).
All permits for discharges into the navigable waters issued pursuant to section
407 of this title shall be deemed to be permits issued under this subchapter, and
permits issued under this subchapter shall be deemed to be permits issued
under section 407 of this title, and shall continue in force and effect for their
term unless revoked, modified, or suspended in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(4) (2000).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
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major regulatory mechanism of the CWA.67 However, Congress limited
the applicability of the permit by narrowing the phrase “discharge of any
pollutant” to only include pollutants from a point source.68
Fundamentally, Congress limited the scope of the NPDES permit
program because it wanted some of the control to remain with the
states.69 The passing of the CWA marked a shift in the federal-state
framework. For the first time, the federal government was encroaching
in state water use laws by setting a national water quality standard.70
However, Congress still wanted some state involvement in water use
legislation and permitting.71 As such, Congress gave states the authority
to develop their own NPDES permit programs as long as they met the
guidelines set forth by the EPA.72 Furthermore, pollutants that do not
originate from a point source are predominately regulated by the states.73
In addition to issuing NPDES permits, Congress permitted the states
along with the EPA to impose civil penalties on polluters.74 The civil
penalties range from injunctive relief to monetary fines up to $25,000
per day per violation.75 In addition, the CWA authorizes criminal
67. Keith Keplinger, The Economics of Total Maximum Daily Loads, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1057, 1058 (2003) (“The major regulatory mechanism of the CWA, the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) focused on the technical
feasibility of achieving effluent standards as the primary factor in establishing pollution
controls in contrast to former clean water legislation, with its emphasis on stateadministered ambient standards.”).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution,
to plan the development and use (including restoration, preservation, and
enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult with the
Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter.
Id.; see also Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (declining to extend the reach of the Clean Water Act to “an
abandoned sand and gravel pit” even though it provided a habitat for migratory birds
because it would intrude too far into state domain).
70. Andreen, supra note 51, at 286.
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000).
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000); see also FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 470
(“Either the states will undertake to regulate nonpoint sources on their own initiative or
they won’t, and there appears to be nothing the EPA can do but to cheer on the ambitious
and chide the apathetic.”).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (2000) (“The Administrator is authorized to commence a
civil action for appropriate relief.”).
75. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (2000) (“The amount of a class I civil penalty under
paragraph (1) may not exceed $ 10,000 per violation, except that the maximum amount
of any class I civil penalty under this subparagraph shall not exceed $25,000.”). The
largest fine ever was $12.6 million for almost 7,000 violations. United States v.
Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 354 (E.D. Va. 1997). However, in 2002, the
average penalty was $11,411 and the median penalty was $15,000. U.S. Environmental
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penalties of imprisonment and large monetary fines up to one million
dollars.76
While the EPA and the states have the ability to enforce the effluent
limitations of NPDES permits, the CWA authorizes citizens to bring
civil actions against any person violating these limitations.77 Furthermore,
citizens may bring a civil action against the EPA Administrator for
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the CWA.78
B. Requirements of the NPDES Program
An NPDES permit is required whenever a point source discharges
pollutants into navigable waters.79 The key terms located within this
section are: (1) discharge of pollutant; (2) point source; and (3)
navigable waters.80 A review of these terms is helpful in evaluating
when an NPDES permit is required by the CWA.
1. Discharge of Pollutant
Under the CWA, a “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any
addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”81
The meaning of “discharge of a pollutant” is constantly being reshaped
by the courts and is not always straightforward.82 As a consequence,

Protection Agency, Comparative Report and Civil and Criminal Penalties Assessed by U.S.
EPA Region 5, http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/annualreports/2002/pentrends92-02.pdf (last
visited Feb. 5, 2005).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000). For some examples of criminal convictions under
the CWA, see Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the “Heightened Criminal Liability”
Imposed on Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 377, 384-93 (1996).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000) (“[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on
his own behalf—against any person . . . [or] any other governmental instrumentality or
agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of [the CWA]”). In environmental
legislation, Congress authorized citizen suits to “motivate governmental agencies
charged with the responsibility to bring enforcement and abatement proceedings.”
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Senate
Committee on Public Works, S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 35-36 (1970)).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a)(2) (2000) (“[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action
on his own behalf—against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this [Act].”).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000).
80. McGaffey, supra note 60, at 9.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
82. See, e.g., S. Fl. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95 (2004); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York,
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courts have come to different conclusions in cases involving similar
activities.83 For example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the stirring up of
streambed sediment by re-circling water can be interpreted as a
discharge of a pollutant.84 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit held that a dam
that stirs up sediment, discharges supersaturated gases, and changes the
water temperature is not adding pollutants.85
As a general rule, water allocation activities do not fall under the
NPDES permitting program to the extent that the waters involved can be
fairly treated as one single water body.86 The principle behind this rule
is cleverly laid out with the following analogy: “If one takes a ladle of
soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one
has not ‘added’ soup or anything else to the pot.”87 In the same sense, if
a dam removes pollutants from a lake and then re-deposits them into the
same lake, a discharge of a pollutant has not occurred.
Ultimately, the method adopted by the courts to ascertain whether two
water bodies are “meaningfully distinct” will determine whether water
transfer activities will fall under the reach of the NPDES permitting
program. For example, if all waters of the United States are viewed as one
giant body of water, as the government’s unitary waters approach implies,
then discharges from water transfer stations would simply be re-circulating
pollutants already present in the water and would thus be exempted from
NPDES permits. On the other hand, if the courts reject the unitary waters
approach, then water transfers between two “meaningfully distinct” water
bodies could require an NPDES permit.
2. Point Source
Under the CWA, a “point source” is defined as “any discernable,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may

273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d 580
(6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
83. Compare Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156, with Rybacheck v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
84. Rybacheck, 904 F.2d at 1285 (holding that placer mining that caused rock,
sand, and minerals from the streambed to be re-suspended in the water column
constituted a discharge of a pollutant as defined by the CWA).
85. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 (holding that water flowing over a dam causing
supersaturation of entrained gas in addition to stirring up the downstream sediment did
not constitute a discharge of a pollutant as defined by the CWA).
86. See Consumer Power, 693 F.2d at 584; Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175; see also
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 12, at 16-17.
87. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 110 (quoting Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492). In Catskill,
this analogy was used to illustrate for the reader the differences between its facts and
those in Gorsuch and Consumer Power. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492.

1272

BLANK.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1259, 2005]

12/22/2005 11:18 AM

The Unitary Waters Approach
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

be discharged.”88 According to EPA regulations, “this definition includes
surface runoff collected and channeled by human effort, and discharges
through pipes, sewers, or other conveyances leading to privately owned
treatment works.”89 However, the CWA excludes several potential sources
of pollution from being a point source. For example, agriculture
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture are not
point sources.90
If the source is determined to not be a point source, then by default it
becomes a nonpoint source.91 In turn, if the pollution comes from a
nonpoint source, then it is characterized as nonpoint source pollution.
Under the CWA, an NPDES permit is not required for nonpoint source
pollution; instead, such pollution is predominately regulated by the
states.92
Since the CWA treats point and nonpoint sources so differently, “the
determination of what constitutes a point source is very consequential.”93
Generally, the courts have held that the point versus nonpoint source
character of a pollutant is determined at the time it first enters the waters
of the United States.94 This interpretation coincides with the EPA’s
policy that pollution should be addressed at its source, not at subsequent
transfers between two bodies of water.95

88. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
89. McGaffey, supra note 60, at 11 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1999)).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) (point source “does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture”).
91. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165-66.
[T]he Act divides the causes and control of water pollution into two categories,
point sources of pollutants (regulated through the § 402 permit program) and
nonpoint sources of pollution (regulated by the states through ‘areawide waste
treatment management plans’ under § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288). The latter
category is defined by exclusion and includes all water quality problems not
subject to § 402.
Id.
92. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he Act provides no direct mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but
rather uses the ‘threat and promise’ of federal grants to the states to accomplish this
task.”); see also Michael C. Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs.
Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 82 (2003) (stating that nonpoint source pollution
“remains largely free of federal regulation”).
93. FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 417.
94. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175 (stating that the “point or nonpoint character of
pollution is established when the pollution first enters navigable water”).
95. Id. at 175-76.
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The approach adopted by the courts to determine whether two bodies
of water are “meaningfully distinct” has the potential to undermine the
EPA’s policy. Consider what would happen if the courts adopt the
hydrological connection test, proposed by the Water District,96 to
determine whether two bodies of water are meaningfully distinct. Under
this approach, transfers between water bodies that do not naturally flow
into one another would fall under the reach of the NPDES permit
program. If the water is polluted, then once the pollution is transferred it
would become point source pollution because water transfer stations are
considered point sources.97 This is true regardless of how the pollution
first entered the waters of the United States. For example, if the
pollution first enters U.S. waters in compliance with the CWA (from a
nonpoint source or an NPDES authorized polluter), and then is
subsequently transferred by a regulated water transfer station, the
pollution would change from “authorized” pollution to point source
pollution, requiring an NPDES permit. This would unjustly hold water
transfer facilities accountable for polluted water that they simply move
from point A to point B. Furthermore, characterizing bodies of water in
this fashion would require multiple parties to obtain NPDES permits for
the same pollution.
3. Navigable Waters
Under the CWA, “navigable waters” are defined as “the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas.”98 In adopting this definition,
Congress wanted to give “navigable waters” the broadest meaning
permissible under the Commerce Clause.99
Furthermore, two Supreme Court cases expanded the definition of
navigable waters to include non-navigable water bodies that share a
significant connection with navigable water bodies.100 In both of these
decisions, the Court discussed factors that should be analyzed when
96. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 110
(2004).
97. Id. at 105.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(“In adopting this definition of ‘navigable waters,’ Congress evidently intended . . . to
exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that
would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.”).
100. See id. (holding that the CWA extends to wetlands that are adjacent to other
water bodies over which the government has jurisdiction); Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (holding that
“an abandoned sand and gravel pit” falls outside the reach of the CWA because it does
not have a significant nexus with a water body over which the government has
jurisdiction).
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deciding whether two water bodies are sufficiently interconnected to be
considered one larger water body.101 Even though these cases deal with
non-navigable water bodies, the same factors can be used by the lower
courts to interpret what the Supreme Court meant by “meaningfully
distinct” water bodies in its Miccosukee decision.
The first of these two Supreme Court cases is United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc.102 In this case, the Court extended the CWA’s
definition of navigable waters to include non-navigable wetlands that are
adjacent to navigable water bodies.103 The Court held that non-navigable
wetlands should be considered “waters of the United States” because they
affect the water quality of adjacent lakes, rivers and streams in several
ways.104 For instance, even though some wetlands do not receive water
from adjacent sources, they can still drain into the adjacent waters.105 In
these circumstances, the wetlands serve as a filter or a purifier for the
water draining into the adjacent waters.106 In addition, the wetlands can
prevent flooding and erosion of the adjacent water body by slowing down
the flow of surface run-off.107 Finally, adjacent wetlands function as an
integral part of the overall aquatic environment by providing general
habitat, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic species.108 The
decision to include non-navigable wetlands within the definition of
“waters of the United States” reflects the Court’s recognition of the
ecological and biological connection between adjacent waters.
The second of the Supreme Court cases that deal with the expansion
of the CWA’s definition of navigable waters to include non-navigable
water bodies is Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.109 In this case, the Court narrowed its earlier
decision in Riverside by mandating that there be a minimum level of
connection between the non-navigable water body and the adjacent
navigable water body.110 The Court concluded that only non-navigable
101. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134-35; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531
U.S. at 170-74.
102. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 134.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 134-35.
109. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army of Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
110. Id. at 167.
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waters that actually abut, are inseparably bound up with, or have a
significant nexus with a navigable waterway would be considered
“waters of the United States.”111 Applying this new standard, the Court
concluded that a significant nexus is not present if the only connection
between the two water bodies is their concurrent use by a few migratory
birds.112
IV. THE UNITARY WATERS APPROACH
A. An Introduction to the Unitary Waters Approach
In Miccosukee, the government argued for a unitary waters or national
approach in defining the nation’s water system.113 Under this approach,
“all the water bodies that fall within the [CWA]’s definition of
‘navigable waters’ . . . should be viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES
permitting requirements.”114 In other words, all waters of the United
States should be viewed as one giant water body. This approach has the
ability to significantly diminish the scope of the NPDES permitting
program by permanently exempting all water transfers from requiring a
permit.
B. An Analysis of the Unitary Waters Approach
The government presents three arguments to support its unitary waters
approach. First, the unitary waters approach preserves the EPA’s
longstanding viewpoint that “the process of merely transporting,
impounding, and releasing navigable waters that may already contain
pollutants does not constitute an ‘addition’ of pollutants to the ‘waters of
the United States.’”115 Second, it preserves the states’ traditional power

111. Id.
112. Id. at 174. This holding invalidated the longstanding interpretation commonly
known as the “Migratory Bird Rule.” Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative Rules
for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 845, 871-72 (2004). The “Migratory Bird Rule” includes, within the reach of the
CWA, any waters “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties” or “[w]hich are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines.” Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
113. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105-06
(2004).
114. Id.
115. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 16.
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to use their water resources as they see fit.116 Lastly, the text and
structure of the CWA signifies Congress’s intent to view the nation’s
water system as a whole for the purposes of NPDES permitting
requirements.117
1. Preserving the EPA’s Longstanding View
The first policy argument used to support the government’s unitary
waters approach is that it preserves the EPA’s longstanding position that
water transfer activities are exempted from the NPDES permit program.118
However, the EPA has never formally adopted this viewpoint.119 The
government gleaned this longstanding position from a pair of cases,
commonly known as the “dam” cases.120 In these cases, the EPA
promulgated that, with respect to pollution, an “addition from a point
source occurs only if the point source itself physically introduces a
pollutant into water from the outside world.”121
The “dam” cases consist of two circuit court decisions: National
Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch122 and National Wildlife Federation v.
Consumer Power Company.123 In Gorsuch, a dam had caused a variety
of interrelated water quality problems to a river downstream from it.124
These problems consisted of low dissolved oxygen levels, dissolved
minerals and nutrients, water temperature changes, sediment release, and
supersaturation.125 The end result of these water quality changes was the
116. Id. at 25 & n.11 (“‘It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State
to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or
otherwise impaired by [the [CWA]].’” (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000))).
117. Id. at 16-21.
118. Id. at 15-20.
119. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273
F.3d 481, 490 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Instead, the EPA’s position is based on a series of
informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA
over the years, primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.”).
120. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 16-17.
121. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988).
122. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.
123. Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 580.
124. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161.
125. Id. Supersaturation occurs when water plunges at high velocity into a water
body. Id. at 164. Depending on the velocity and turbulence, the receiving water body
could become aerated in excess of normal concentration. Id. This excess aeration is
harmless to humans but can be fatal to fish. Id.
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destruction of nearly a half-million fish.126 In Consumer Power, a dam
located on Lake Michigan generated power by forcing water through its
turbines.127 During the normal operation of the dam, fish would be
sucked into the generator and would be destroyed as a consequence.128
Afterwards, the water, along with the dead fish, would be pumped back
into Lake Michigan, thereby diminishing water quality.129
The EPA has consistently maintained that dam-induced water changes
are not covered under the CWA and as such do not require an NPDES
permit.130 In both “dam” cases, the courts gave great deference to the
EPA’s interpretation and adopted its viewpoint in their rulings.131 In
arguing for a unitary waters approach, the government has interpreted
the “dam” holdings as proof of the EPA’s longstanding position that
water transfer activities are exempted from the NPDES permit
program.132
Recently, three U.S. courts of appeals (including the appellate court in
Miccosukee) have undermined this position by holding that an NPDES
permit can be required for water transfer activities between two separate
bodies of water.133 These three courts recognized that the “dam” courts
adopted the EPA’s position that an NPDES permit is only required for
point sources that introduce pollutants into waters of the United States
from the outside world.134 However, neither the EPA nor the “dam”
courts had established whether the “outside world” included other bodies

126. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (D.D.C. 1982),
rev’d, Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
127. Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 581-82.
128. Id. at 582.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 587; see also Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 168 (“[The] EPA has never changed
its basic position that dams generally do not require NPDES permits.”).
131. See Consumer Power, 862 F.2d at 590; see also Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 183
(“[The] EPA’s interpretation is reasonable, not inconsistent with congressional intent,
and entitled to great deference; therefore, it must be upheld.”).
132. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 16-17. In its Brief the government stated that the “EPA and the lower courts have
long recognized that the process of merely transporting, impounding, and releasing
navigable waters that may already contain pollutants does not constitute an ‘addition’ of
pollutants to ‘the waters of the United States’ in the sense that the Clean Water Act uses
those terms.” Id. at 16.
133. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364,
1368-69 (11th Cir. 2002); Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he transfer of water containing
pollutants from one body of water to another, distinct body of water is plainly an
addition and thus a ‘discharge’ that demands an NPDES permit.”); Dubois v. Loon
Mountain Recreation Corp., 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the transfer
of water from one water body to another constitutes an “addition”).
134. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; Dubois, 102 F.3d at
1299.
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of water.135 All three appeals courts determined that in the “dam” cases,
the EPA was not arguing for a complete exemption of all water transfer
activities, but only an exemption for those transfers that occur within the
same water body.136
However, the “dam” cases need to be put in the proper context.137
First, in both “dam” cases the body of water that was receiving the
“polluted water” and the body of water which was the source of the
“polluted water” were one and the same.138 Second, the issue in the
“dam” cases was whether certain dam-induced water quality changes
constituted discharges of pollutants, not whether the pollutants traveled
from one water body to another.139
The three appeals courts distinguished the “dam” cases and expressly
stated that the EPA had never adopted the position that all water transfer
activities were exempted from the NPDES permitting program.140 All
three courts dismissed the exception argument stating that the “outside
world” includes other water bodies.141
Of the three appellate-level cases, the most pertinent is Catskill Mountain
Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York.142 In Catskill, the conflict
involved the Shandaken Tunnel, which transferred water from the more
polluted Schoharie Reservoir to Esopus Creek, a world class trout stream.143
In this case, the court refused to adopt the EPA’s position on dam
exemptions because unlike the “dam” cases, the water was diverted from
one water body through a tunnel to a completely different water body.144
135. See Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1368; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; see also Brief for
the Respondent Friends of the Everglades, supra note 14, at 27-28.
136. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367-68; Catskill, 273 F.3d at 491; Dubois, 102 F.3d
at 1299.
137. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 492 (“The Gorsuch and Consumer Power decisions
comport with the plain meaning of ‘addition,’ assuming that the water from which the
discharges came is the same as that to which they go.”).
138. Id. at 491-92.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., id. at 490.
If the EPA’s position had been adopted in a rulemaking or other formal
proceeding, deference of the sort applied by the Gorsuch and Consumers
Power courts might be appropriate. Instead, the EPA’s position is based on a
series of informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions
taken by the EPA over the years, primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.
Id.
141. See supra text accompanying note 133.
142. Catskill, 273 F.3d at 481.
143. Id. at 484-85.
144. Id. at 492.
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The Catskill ruling is bolstered by the fact that the EPA has never
issued a formal position contradicting the result.145 Therefore, in light of
the decision in Catskill and the EPA’s response to it, it appears that the
government’s first argument—preserving the EPA’s longstanding
unitary waters view—is not entirely accurate. The government’s
argument will have persuasive value only if the EPA takes the formal
position that all water transfer activities merely connecting or conveying
navigable waters are exempted from NPDES permitting.
2. Maintaining States’ Rights
The second policy argument in support of the government’s unitary
waters approach is that such approach preserves the states’ traditional
power to regulate and use their water resources.146 This power is
codified in section 1251 of the CWA which declares, “[i]t is the policy
of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of
water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or
otherwise impaired by this [Act].”147 It is the government’s opinion that
requiring NPDES permits for water transfer activities within a state’s
borders would violate section 1251.148
First, requiring NPDES permits for water transfer activities could
interfere with the maximum utilization of the states’ water resources.149
In the western United States, water is scarce.150 Consequently, it is
important for these states to be able to transfer water freely within their
145. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107
(2004) (“[T]he Government does not identify any administrative documents in which
EPA has espoused that position.”). Furthermore, there is some evidence that the EPA
took the opposite position in the past. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator
Carol M. Browner et al. of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in
Support of Respondents, supra note 44, at 17-18. In a formal decision, the EPA General
Counsel stated “[i]t is therefore my opinion that, even should the finder of fact determine
that . . . [the] ditch is a navigable water, it would still be permittable as a point source
where it discharges into another navigable water body, provided that the other point
source criteria are also present.” Id. (quoting EPA General Counsel Opinions, No. 21
(June 27, 1975)).
146. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note
12, at 25-28.
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
148. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, supra note
12, at 25.
149. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 11-22; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Water
Resources Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 14-19.
150. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 2 (“West of the 100th Meridian, the nation is generally arid; that
is, it receives less than thirty inches of annual precipitation necessary to sustain non-irrigated
agriculture.”).
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borders in order to meet the needs of their populations.151 This is
especially true in cases of emergency. For instance, over the past few
years, some western states have experienced devastating droughts and
accompanying wild fires.152 In order to fight these droughts and fires, it
is necessary to quickly transfer vast quantities of water.153 If NPDES
permits were required for these transfers, then it is possible that these
transfers would be delayed.154
Second, NPDES permits would impair existing state water
activities.155 Many states, especially in the West, move vast quantities of
water among and within various bodies of water within their borders in
order to meet a wide range of needs.156 Some of these transfers involve
moving water from more polluted water bodies to less polluted ones.157
151. For example, in Colorado sixty percent of its citizens depend on water that is
transferred from other areas. Id. at 2-3.
152. “In 2002, Colorado experienced its most severe single-year drought on
record.” Melinda Kassen, Statutory Expansion of State Agencies’ Authority to
Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado’s Drought, 7 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 47, 48 (2003). In 2003, California experienced severe wild fires
in which 959,955 acres were burned. Joel Rubin et al., Weather Cools Wildfires’ Fury,
L.A. TIMES, Oct 31, 2003, at Al.
153. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 18-20.
154. An application for a NPDES permit is required to be submitted at least 180
days before the date of the initial discharge. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21(c) (2003). Furthermore,
a permit is effective 30 days after the agency decisions. 40 C.F.R. § 124.15(b).
Therefore, under the normal terms of the NPDES permit program, a state would be
required to wait at least 210 days before a NPDES permit could be issued and made
effective.
155. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 17-30; Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects
Coalition et al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 5-14.
156. The California State Water Project is the nation’s largest water conveyance
system. California Department of Water Resources, The SWP Today, http://www.
publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp/swptoday.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). It consists of
33 storage facilities, 21 lakes and reservoirs, and 662 miles of canals and pipelines. Id.
This unique system supplies the water for more than twenty million Californians.
California
Department
of
Water
Resources,
Central
Valley
Project,
http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp/cvp.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2005). An
example of a smaller water conveyance system is the Colorado-Big Thompson Project.
Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 44, at 16 n.14. In this project, enough water is transferred to irrigate over
600,000 acres. Id. at 2.
157. Run-off from snow melt and thunderstorms can contain naturally occurring
pollutants that would trigger the need for a NPDES permit if the water containing the
run-off is later transferred. Brief Amici Curiae of the National Water Resources Ass’n et
al. in Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 16. Furthermore, the majority of water
conveyance systems in the West use open ditches and canals which are directly impacted
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If the NPDES permitting program reaches these water transfer activities,
then these transfers would require a permit. States could be forced to
spend millions of dollars constructing treatment facilities in order to
comply with the NPDES permitting process.158 If the states could not
afford to make the changes necessary to comply with the NPDES permit
system, then some water transfer activities might be stopped.
Third, permitting water transfer activities could interfere with interstate
water allocations.159 A significant number of water transfer activities
occur within interstate stream systems.160 The water from these systems
is allocated by multi-state compacts or Supreme Court decrees.161
Subjecting these water transfer activities to the NPDES permitting
program would have “significant practical consequences” for interstate
allocations.162 For instance, a state that is on the giving end of water
allocations could, if its water transfer station were required to obtain a
permit, be forced to build expensive treatment facilities or reduce the
amount of water that it transfers in order to comply with the permit.163
As a consequence, the states on the receiving end of these water
allocations would experience higher water costs or a decrease in the
amount of water available for beneficial use.164
However, while requiring an NPDES permit would demand more
from individual states in terms of compliance, it is not clear whether
subjecting water transfer activities to the NPDES permitting program
would unduly infringe on the states’ rights. First, a vast majority of the
water transfers would not fall under the reach of the NPDES program
because they either involve transfers from more pristine waters to those

by run-off. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 16 n.13.
158. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 15-16.
To avoid the potential to cause an excursion above the water quality standards
of the receiving water body during spring runoff, a transbasin diverter might
have to expend millions of dollars to construct a treatment facility or
implement so-called best management practices in an attempt to reduce the
presence of even natural pollutants.
Id.
159. See supra note 156.
160. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 1-4.
161. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 617l (2000) (authorizing the Colorado River Compact
signed by Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 592 (1963) (allocating the lower Colorado River
among Arizona, California, and Nevada).
162. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 108
(2004); see also supra text accompanying notes 155-157.
163. See supra text accompanying note 158.
164. Id.
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that are less pristine or consist simply of diverting water away from a
body of water.165 Second, even if an NPDES permit is required, there
are several ways to expedite the process. The EPA and the states166 have
the authority to issue “general permits” which can cover an entire
category of activities.167 These general permits could substantially
streamline the permitting process and provide considerable flexibility in
scheduled compliance.168 In addition, if the states had to issue individual
NPDES permits, their familiarity with the affected bodies of water
would allow them to act quickly on permit applications.169
3. Statutory Interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
The government argues that the language of the CWA supports its
unitary waters approach.170 As mentioned before, the CWA defines the
term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to
165. Brief of Amici Curiae Former Administrator Carol M. Browner et al. of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency in Support of Respondents, supra note
44, at 24-25.
166. Forty-two out of the fifty states have the authority from the EPA to issue
general permits. 65 Fed. Reg. 50,528, 50,529 (Aug. 18, 2000); see also Randy Hill,
NPDES Permit Application and Issuance Procedures, in THE CLEAN WATER HANDBOOK
43 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003).
167. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003).
Discharges . . . may, at the discretion of the Director, be authorized to
discharge under a general permit without submitting a notice of intent where
the Director finds that a notice of intent requirement would be inappropriate.
In making such a finding, the Director shall consider: the type of discharge; the
expected nature of the discharge; the potential for toxic and conventional
pollutants in the discharges; the expected volume of the discharges; other
means of identifying discharges covered by the permit; and the estimated
number of discharges to be covered by the permit. The Director shall provide
in the public notice of the general permit the reasons for not requiring a notice
of intent.
Id.
168. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 108
n.* (2004).
General permits greatly reduce that administrative burden by authorizing
discharges from a category of point sources within a specified geographic area.
Once EPA or a state agency issues such a permit, covered entities, in some
cases, need take no further action to achieve compliance with the NPDES
besides adhering to the permit conditions.
Id.
169. Brief of the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 44, at 25-26.
170. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 18-20.
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navigable waters from any point source.”171 In this definition, “any” is
used to modify “addition,” “pollutant,” and “point source,” but not to
modify “navigable waters.” The government thus argues that the absence
of the modifier “any” before “navigable waters” indicates Congress’s
intent to view the nation’s water system as one large water body.172 As
such, it insists that if Congress wanted to include the movement of water
from one water body to another within the reach of the NPDES
permitting program, then “it would have made that extraordinary
intention manifest.”173 The government urges that this intention could
have been manifested by either adding the word “any” or another
appropriate modifier before “navigable waters.” 174 Furthermore, when it
intended to refer only to individual water bodies in other parts of the
CWA, Congress used appropriate modifiers to so indicate.175
Another argument raised by the government to support its interpretation
is that it has been expressly recognized that water transfer activities
should be regulated through means other than the NPDES permitting
program.176 For example, in section 101(g) the CWA stipulates that the
states, not the EPA, have primary responsibility with respect to the
development and use of their water resources.177 Furthermore, Congress
has recognized that the water quality issues arising from water transfer
activities are closely associated with nonpoint sources of pollution,
171. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
172. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 19.
173. Id.
174. “At the least, [Congress] would have defined the ‘discharge of a pollutant’ to
include ‘any addition of any pollutant to [a specific portion of the] navigable waters from
any point source.’” Id.
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (2000).
Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator or as identified under section
304, discharges of pollutants from a point source or group of point sources,
with the application of effluent limitations required under section 301(b)(2) of
this Act, would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of that water
quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters which shall assure
protection of public health, public water supplies, agricultural and industrial
uses, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish,
fish and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water, effluent
limitations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such point
source or sources shall be established which can reasonably be expected to
contribute to the attainment or maintenance of such water quality.
Id. (emphasis added).
176. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12,
at 25-28.
177. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000). The legislative history reveals that “[i]t is the
purpose of this amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not subverted.”
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 721 (1994)
(quoting SENATE AND PUBLIC WORKS COMM, 95D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977 578 (Comm. Print 1978)).
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which do not require an NPDES permit and should be regulated as
such.178
However, the government’s interpretation of the CWA loses momentum
when viewed in light of its overall objective. In general, courts should
favor interpreting statutory terms in ways that further the overall
objective of the statute.179 As mentioned earlier, the overall objective of
the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”180 The government’s unitary waters
approach would undermine this objective by allowing water from polluted
water bodies to be transferred to more pristine water sources. For
instance, under the government’s unitary waters approach, the NPDES
permitting program would not regulate the transferring of water from a
waterway, which serves as a repository for raw sewage from factories
and towns, to a water body that serves as a drinking water reservoir.181
Moreover, discharges of pollutants that occur in water transfer activities
will not be adequately regulated by the nonpoint source pollution
programs.182 In general, nonpoint source programs have proven
unsuccessful in protecting our waters.183 A 1998 survey conducted by
178. A discussion in the House Report illustrates this point:
Section 304[e] addresses the problem of nonpoint sources of pollutants. This
Section and the information on such nonpoint sources is among the most
important in the 1972 Amendments. If our water pollution problems are to be
truly solved, we are going to have to vigorously address the problems of
nonpoint sources. The Committee, therefore, expects the Administrator to be
most diligent in gathering and distribution of the guidelines for the
identification of nonpoint sources and the information on processes,
procedures, and methods for control of pollution from such nonpoint sources
as . . . natural and man made changes in the normal flow of surface and ground
waters.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at 26-27
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 109 (1972)).
179. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statues in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 405, 503-05 (1989). See generally Robert R.M. Verchick, Toward Normative
Rules for Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 55
ALA. L. REV. 845 (2004).
180. 33 U.S.C. 1251(a) (2000).
181. This example is roughly based on the facts of Dubois v. United States
Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
182. See The National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1988, 65
Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,587 (July 13, 2000).
183. “The success in cleaning up pollution from point sources has not been matched
by controls over polluted runoff from sources such as farms, urban areas, forestry,
ranching, and mining operations.” FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 391-92. A recent
report to Congress has indicated that “rainwater runoff from urban and agricultural land
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the EPA found that nearly forty percent of the nation’s waters are so
polluted that they cannot support basic activities like swimming and
fishing.184 The same report acknowledges that the majority of the pollution
comes from nonpoint sources, which fall outside the reach of the NPDES
Therefore, if we follow the government’s
permitting program.185
suggestion to treat water transfer activities the same as nonpoint source
pollution, we are effectively ignoring the problem. This flies in the face
of the objective of the CWA.
C. Is the Unitary Waters Approach a Viable Interpretation
of the Clean Water Act?
Before discussing whether the unitary waters approach is a viable
interpretation of the CWA, it is necessary to review the court’s role in
reviewing an agency’s interpretation. In general, courts give great
deference to the construction of a statute by an administrating agency.186
This is especially true in the case of the EPA’s interpretions of the CWA
187
However, if an
because of the complex subject matter involved.
agency’s interpretation nullifies another section of the same statute, then
it will be ruled unreasonable and rejected.188
In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court raised concerns over a potential
conflict between the government’s unitary waters approach and other
NPDES provisions.189 One of these conflicts lies within the “intake
credits” provision of the NPDES program.190 Under this provision,
“intake credits” are issued to industrial water users for the pollution that
are a leading source of impairment.” The National Water Quality Inventory Report to
Congress for 1988, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43,587.
184. Office of Wastewater Management of the EPA, Water Pollution Control: 25
Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 2 (1998),
http://www.epa.gov/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF (last visited Feb 4, 2005).
185. Id.
186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(stating that the Court has “long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer”).
187. “Congress generally intended that EPA would exercise substantial discretion
in interpreting the [Clean Water] Act.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumer Power Co.,
862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d
156, 173 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). However, there is some debate on whether the government’s
unitary waters approach should be given deference because the EPA has never formally
adopted it. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
188. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001) (stating
that a reasonable interpretation can never nullify another section of the same statute).
189. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 107-08
(2004) (“The ‘unitary waters’ approach could also conflict with current NPDES
regulations.”).
190. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45 (2003).

1286

BLANK.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1259, 2005]

12/22/2005 11:18 AM

The Unitary Waters Approach
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

is already present in the water that they use.191 When these users return
the water after use, these credits ensure that they will not be forced to
remove the pollutants that were in the water before it was withdrawn.192
However, the NPDES program explains that these credits are issued
“only if the discharger demonstrates that the intake water is drawn from
the same body of water into which the discharge is made.”193 Therefore,
it appears that the NPDES permit does regulate water flows within
individual water bodies. The government’s approach also conflicts with
the water quality standards program of the CWA.194 This program requires
the states to set water quality standards based on the “designated uses of
the navigable waters involved.”195 Generally, the states assign different
designated uses not only to separate water bodies, but to different
portions of the same water bodies.196 If the water body fails to achieve
its designated use, then the state must allocate a reduction among all
NPDES permit holders that are discharging pollutants into the water
body.197 Therefore, this program appears to protect the individual uses
of the different water bodies. This dynamic is inconsistent with the
government’s unitary waters approach which treats all waters of the
United States as one giant water body.198
V. OTHER POSSIBLE METHODS FOR DEFINING “MEANINGFULLY
DISTINCT” WATER BODIES
In Miccosukee, the Water District and the Tribe had different
opinions on how the Court should define a “meaningfully distinct”
water body.199 The Tribe wanted to group water bodies based on
biological and ecosystem characteristics.200 In contrast, the Water
191. Id.
192. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 107-08.
193. Id. at 107 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4)).
194. The CWA requires states to establish water quality standards for all intrastate
waters and to review them every three years. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000).
195. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). Some examples of the more common designated
uses are: “drinking water, water-based recreation, fishing/eating, aquatic life, agriculture
water supply, and industrial water supply.” FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 456.
196. FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 456.
197. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
198. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105-06
(2004).
199. Id. at 110.
200. Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at
6-7.
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District wanted the Court to focus on whether the water bodies shared
a hydrological connection.201
A. Biological and Ecosystem Characteristics
The Tribe argued that “meaningfully distinct” water bodies are those
that do not share similar biological and ecosystem characteristics.202
This approach makes sense when viewed in light of the overall goal of
the CWA: “to restore . . . the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation’s waters.”203 In short, biological integrity, and the life
forms that a water body naturally supports, cannot be restored without
addressing the chemical composition and the physical make-up of the
water. For example, fish that are naturally occurring in a stream will no
longer thrive there if the water becomes too acidic or too warm (to name
a few of many changes that a water body can undergo with the addition
of pollutants).204 By focusing on the natural biological and ecosystem
characteristics of water as a means of grouping water bodies together, as
the Tribe encouraged, the overarching goal of the CWA would be
furthered.
Furthermore, a biological and ecosystem approach to classifying water
systems is not a new one. The Supreme Court has adopted this approach
when determining whether a non-navigable water body should fall
within the CWA’s definition of “navigable waters.”205 In United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme Court held that nonnavigable wetlands which significantly affect the water quality and
aquatic ecosystem of an adjacent navigable water body should be
included within the reach of the CWA.206 With this decision, the Court
acknowledged the importance of ecological and biological distinctions
between water bodies.207

201. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 6-7.
202. Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at
6-7.
203. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
204. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
205. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (stating that the Court “found that Congress’ concern for the
protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems indicated its intent to regulate
wetlands ‘inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States’”); United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985); see supra text
accompanying notes 102-108.
206. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 139.
207. Id.
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B. Hydrological Connections
If the Court decided to define “meaningfully distinct” based on
hydrological connections, then the focus would be on whether bodies of
water naturally intermingle with each other.208 The rationale behind this
division is that if the waters already intermingle, then taking water from
one source and transferring it to another will have no effect.209
This approach appears to be in line with the overall objective of the
CWA. If the waters naturally share a significant hydrological connection,
then pumping water between sources will have no additional effect on
the physical, chemical, or biological integrity of the waters.210 This is
also consistent with the EPA’s position involving the “dam” cases
because mere conveyances or transfers within the same body of water
would be excluded.211
However, if the pumping activity is significantly mixing the two
sources beyond the naturally occurring transfer, then this approach
begins to undermine the overall objective of the CWA. For example, in
Miccosukee, natural seepage between the Canal and the Wetland was
found, and the Water District used the existence of such water flow to
draw a hydrological connection between the two water bodies.212 While
this was a hydrological connection, the water was being pumped from
the Canal into the Wetland at a significantly higher rate than the natural
gradual seepage from the Wetland to the Canal.213 Furthermore, the
natural mixing of water was found to flow from the Wetland to the
Canal, the opposite direction of the water transfer from the pumping
activity.214 This indicates that there was no naturally occurring transfer
of the water in the direction of the pumping mechanism. Consequently,
the pumping activity was mixing the two sources beyond any naturally
occurring transfer, which in this case was threatening the biological
208. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 6-7.
209. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 109-10
(2004).
210. Id. at 109-10.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 120-132.
212. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 109-11.
213. Water is pumped from the Canal to the Wetlands at 2880 cubic feet per
second. Brief for Respondent Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, supra note 24, at
8.
214. The Canal is east of the Wetland and the natural flow of the water is eastward.
Id. Therefore, absent the water transfer station, the water would naturally flow form the
Wetland into the Canal. Id.
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integrity of the Wetland.215 Thus, this transfer undermined the overall
purpose of the CWA, and the water transfer facility should have been
required to obtain an NPDES permit.
C. A Possible Compromise
It is possible for the Court to adopt both approaches in a two step
process. First, the Court must determine whether the two water bodies
have similar biological characteristics and/or ecosystems. If they do
possess such similar qualities, then the water bodies can be viewed as
one larger water body and the NPDES permitting program would not
reach any water transfers between them. However, if they do not
possess similar biological characteristics or ecosystems, then the Court
must determine whether the two water bodies are so hydrologically
connected that the commingling of the two water sources would still
occur to the same degree absent human intervention. If the Court
determines that a sufficient amount of water naturally flows between
them, then these water bodies are viewed as one and any water transfers
between them are exempted from the NPDES permit program. On the
other hand, if the Court determines that they are not significantly
hydrologically connected, then these two water bodies should be
considered “meaningfully distinct” and any water transferred between
them can be regulated by the NPDES permit program.
VI. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
The potential consequences of subjecting water transfer activities to
NPDES permit requirements can be significant, especially for the
western states. Typically, the western states receive less than thirty
inches of rain a year.216 This rainfall does not satisfy the water needs of
the citizens within these states.217 Therefore, it is necessary to transfer
water though a complex system of man-made reservoirs and natural
water systems.218 These transfer systems could be held responsible for
the clean-up costs for a disproportionate amount of pollution. As
indicated above, if water transfer activities are considered point sources
regulated by the CWA, then any pollutant that passes through them
becomes the responsibility of the water transfer manager.219 Water
215. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 101-02.
216. Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Colorado and New Mexico in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 44, at 2.
217. Id.
218. Id.; see supra note 156 and accompanying text.
219. Brief of Amici Curiae the Nationwide Public Projects Coalition et al. in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 44, at 6-12.
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managers would be responsible for cleaning any pollutant that passes
through their system, regardless of origin. To put this in perspective, a
water manager located in Southern California could be responsible for a
nonpoint source pollutant that enters the Colorado River in Arizona but
is later conveyed by a water transfer station in San Diego. Additionally,
these water managers would be civilly and criminally liable for the
pollution.220
The facts in Miccosukee highlight the potential unfairness of holding
water transfer managers responsible for the pollution that passes through
their stations.221 In Miccosukee, the Water District was brought into
court for pollution that was generated from agricultural run-off.222
However, a quick look at the parties of the case shows that no person or
organization producing the pollutant will be held liable for this
pollution.223 Why? Because agricultural run-off is specifically defined
as a nonpoint source and as such, is outside the reach of the NPDES
permit program.224 Therefore, the Water District was sued over a
pollutant that, absent a subsequent transfer point, would not be subject to
NPDES regulation. Furthermore, the Water District had no choice but to
pump the polluted water.225 If the pumps were turned off, a populated
area would have been flooded.226
On the other hand, even though regulating water transfers has the
potential to unfairly prejudice water managers, this decision does have
its justifications. Primarily, as mentioned earlier, to exempt all water
transfers would undermine the overriding policy of the CWA.227 In
addition, regulating water transfers presents an alternative for the
unsuccessful nonpoint source pollution plan that is currently in place.
The CWA has not been successful in eliminating nonpoint source
pollution from U.S. waters.228 In a 1998 report to Congress, the EPA
reported that thirty-five percent of rivers and streams and forty-five
percent of lakes are still impaired and further acknowledged that
220. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2000).
221. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
222. Id. at 100-02.
223. The only defendant is the South Florida Water District. Id. at 95.
224. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 90.
225. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
226. See supra text accompanying note 20.
227. See supra Section IV(B)(3).
228. See Nancy Stoner, Clean Water at Risk: A 30th Anniversary Assessment of the
Bush Administration’s Rollback of Clean Water Protections 9-24 (2002),
http://www.amrivers.org/doc_respository/cwa30.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2005).
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nonpoint source pollution is the main reason why these waters are still
polluted.229 Moreover, the report went on to state that the leading cause
of noncompliance of rivers and streams is nonpoint source run-off from
agriculture.230
Currently, there are federally subsidized facilities that are used to
improve water quality.231 These publicly owned treatment works
(POTWs) collect wastewater from surrounding areas and remove
harmful pollutants from the waste so that it may be safely discharged
into the receiving water body.232 Water transfer stations could follow
this model and act as treatment centers for nonpoint source pollution that
enters U.S. waters. This approach might be a fair balance between the
inequity of holding water transfer managers liable for another’s pollution
and the need to develop a program addressing nonpoint source pollution.
However, this approach would be extremely costly.233 In the end, a
proposal of this magnitude would ultimately have to be approved by
Congress.
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, how the Court ultimately defines “meaningfully distinct”
water bodies will determine whether water transfer activities fall within
the reach of the NPDES program. Under the government’s unitary
waters approach, all water transfers would not require NPDES permits.
229. Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and
Revisions to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of
Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg.
43,586, 43,587 (July 13, 2000).
230. Id.; see also David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and
Regulatory Control: The Clean Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 515, 517-18 (1996) (stating that nonpoint sources account for sixty-five to
seventy-five percent of the pollution in the nation’s most polluted waters and that
agriculture run-off is “the single largest nonpoint source of surface water pollution”).
231. See FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 57, at 454-55 for a general discussion of
POTWs.
232. Id.
Public owned treatment works (POTWs) collect wastewater from homes,
commercial buildings, and industrial facilities and transport it via a series of
pipes, known as a collection system, to the treatment plant. The POTW
removes harmful organisms and other contaminates from the sewage so it can
be discharged safely in the receiving water body.
Id. In order to encourage the construction of POTWs, the government created a $60
billion federal grant program. Id. at 455. As a condition of receiving grant money, the
states were required “to establish area-wide management agencies with both planning
and regulatory functions for waste treatment.” Id.
233. In a 1998 report, the EPA suggested that it would cost an estimated $139.5
billion to correct the current water quality problems. Office of Wastewater Management,
Water Pollution Control: 25 Years of Progress and Challenges for the New Millennium 2
(1998), http://www.epa.gov/npdespub/pubs/25PROG.PDF (last visited Feb 4, 2005).
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In contrast, under the Tribe’s biological and ecosystem approach and
the Water District’s hydrological approach, at least some water transfer
activities would be regulated by the NPDES program. Although the
government presents several arguments to support its approach, none of
them are clearly convincing. Furthermore, its approach appears to
conflict with other aspects of the CWA, possibly causing the Court to
reject it on those grounds alone. However, the government is correct
that exposing water transfer activities to the NPDES program could
unfairly shift the clean-up of water pollution to the people in charge of
these transfer stations. This reason alone is insufficient to totally exempt
all water transfer activities from the NPDES program regardless of their
environmental impacts. Instead, the government should treat these water
transfer points as an opportunity to solve the nonpoint source pollution
problems facing the nation.
Both the Water District’s and the Tribe’s approach appear consistent
with the overall objective of the CWA. Instead of choosing one
approach over the other, it would make the most sense to adopt them
both in a two-step test.234 This test would ensure that water transfers
causing environmental harm to the receiving water body would fall
within the reach of the NPDES permit program, but would not impose
NPDES permitting requirements on water transfers within the same
water body.
BRAD W. BLANK

234.

See supra Part V.C.
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